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Abstract 
Our objective in this paper is to analyze empirically the relationship between the 
external finance premium of non-financial corporations in Brazil with their default 
probability and with their demand for inventories. As for the former relation, we 
find that corporations that have greater external finance premium have greater 
probability of default. As for the latter, we find that the external finance premium 
is positive and statistically significantly correlated. The results confirm previous 
results of the literature that indicate that the balance sheet channel of monetary 
policy is relevant in Brazil.  
Keywords: Monetary Transmission Mechanism, Credit Channel, Balance Sheet 
Channel. 
JEL Classification: G30, G32 
 
 
                                                 
* Banco Central do Brasil, Research Department.  
** Caixa de Previdência dos Funcionários do Banco do Brasil. 
3 
1.  Introduction 
 
In Brazil, the credit channel is a recent phenomenon. The high inflation before the Real 
Plan prevented credit market’s development. Even after the economy reached price stability, 
the real interest rate high volatility and the internal and external shocks that were 
commonplace in Brazil dampened this process. Over the last years, however, the gradual 
removal of some factors that used to make the country susceptible to these shocks allowed the 
interest rate reductions and the credit supply expansion. In this context, the credit channel 
grows in importance.  
The credit channel theory enhances how credit market imperfections amplify monetary 
policy effects. In this framework, the external finance premium is the key variable, defined as 
the difference between the cost of raising funds externally and the opportunity cost of internal 
funds. However, as Graeve (2008) depicts, a major problem for empirical studies in this area 
is that the external finance premium is unobservable.  
In this way, great part of empirical work that tries to test this monetary transmission 
mechanism set proxies to external finance premium and verifies differences in business cycle 
responses and corporate investments between groups of firms separated according to 
constraints faced in credit market access. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliveira (2009), for 
example, used financial indicators to reflect the external finance premium dynamic and the 
firm size to measure the credit market access, focusing on firms from United States and Brazil 
respectively. Both papers show that small firms have a more sensitive business cycle to 
changes in external finance premium. This result is considered an evidence of credit channel 
working in these economies. 
In this paper, we use financial indicators usually related with credit market 
imperfections to show the existence of common factors between the external finance premium 
and the firm’s default probability and study the sensitivity of business cycle, represented by 
inventories, to the external finance premium. 
Our database comes from Economática and Comissão Valores Mobiliários (CVM). Our 
database consist of a unbalanced panel data formed with information of non-financial publicly 
held companies listed at Bovespa from the third quarter of 1994 to third quarter of 2009. 
Insolvency and global long-term debt rating were the criteria that we chose to measure the 
firm’s credit market access. The concept of insolvency adopted was the beginning of a 
bankruptcy or recovery legal procedure. This information was obtained from Bovespa's Daily 
Information Bulletin (Boletim Diário de Informações - BDI) and CVM’s publicly held 
4companies register. The rating’s information was obtained in Fitch Ratings, Moodys and 
Standard & Poors release list. The sample consists of 332 firms, of which 12 are insolvent 
firms and 37 are firms with ratings for its long-term debt.  
Considering that companies that became insolvent through time must have faced more 
constraints in credit market access, the default probability must be directly proportional to 
external finance premium. Using Logit and Complementary Log Log regressions to relate a 
dummy variable created for the insolvent companies and indicators related with the external 
finance premium, we have obtained evidence supporting this hypothesis.  
We selected our credit constrained sample based on our credit restriction criteria and 
used this sample to relate firm’s inventories and the external finance premium, by estimating a 
dynamic panel data model System GMM. Our results showed that: (1) the credit channel in 
Brazil gained strength after the introduction of primary fiscal surplus, inflation targets and 
free-floating exchange rate in 1999; (2) insolvent and no rating firms have the inventories 
more elastic to the external finance premium; (3) firms with financing operations directly 
obtained at the BNDES have inventories less sensitive to the external finance premium; and 
(4) economic sectors often highlighted as formed by firms with small scale, history of 
financial problems and high level of external and unfair competition showed more elasticity 
of inventories to the external finance premium.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in two manners. In the first one, we did not find 
any similar and recent empirical research in the literature that analysis the relationship 
between the external finance premium and default probability. In the second one, our 
identification of credit market restrictions using the insolvency criteria is also original.
1 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literature 
focusing on the description of credit channel theory and characteristics often designed to 
measure credit market access. Section 3 provides data description. Section 4 presents the 
empirical work. Section 5 does robustness analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical Background 
 
Following Bernanke and Gertler (1995), there are two mechanisms connecting 
monetary shocks and the external finance premium. The first one, the bank-lending channel, 
emphasizes how monetary policy affects bank’s credit supply. The second one, the balance 
                                                 
1 As for the debt ratings as a criterion to measure the credit market access, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995, 
1998) used this criteria for the north-American economy. However, we didn’t find any empirical papers using 
this criterion for Brazil. 
5sheet channel, explores the monetary policy impacts over borrower’s balance sheet. These 
mechanisms are broadly called as the credit channel. 
In bank lending channel, a monetary contraction causes a decrease in demand deposits, 
reducing the bank’s loans supply. Even if this reduction doesn’t imply a total restriction to 
credit costs associated with the establishment of relationships and capture of resources with 
new lenders would increase the agency costs in loan contracts and raise the external finance 
premium. Considering that bank deposits do not have a perfect substitute, the capital 
replacement by banks would generate additional costs that also could raise the external 
finance premium. In turn, the higher external finance premium would decrease the credit 
demand, the investment’s level and the economic growth level.  
In the balance sheet channel, a tighten monetary policy would affect adversely the 
firm’s financial position at least in three ways: (1) reduces the asset prices, diminishing the 
value of collateral available as guarantee for new and actual loans; (2) raises the interest 
expenses, decreasing the company’s cash flow; e (3) decreases the consumption level, 
affecting profits and impacting the company’s cash flow again.  
The firm’s deteriorated balance sheet raises the counterparty risk for lenders and 
scrutinizes new credit contracts. Moreover, the reduction in firms net worth increases the 
moral hazard involved in companies’ management once the owners share value is lower, 
encouraging riskier investments. This movement raises the external finance premium and 
restricts the credit supply, the investments level and the aggregate demand.  
According to Mishkin (1995), between these mechanisms, the balance sheet channel has 
been highlighted by its background theory rationality. Among the elements that stand this 
mechanism out are the further rationale for asset price effects emphasized in monetarist 
thinking and the fact that unlike the traditional view in the monetary policy transmission is the 
short term nominal interest rate, not the long term real interest rate, which drives the monetary 
shocks effects to real economy. 
Great part of empirical works found in literature tries to gauge at the existence of an 
active credit channel through the balance sheet channel background. The usual way tries to 
obtain proofs about the financial accelerator importance to corporative sector distinguishing 
the behavior of business cycle and investment decisions between different groups of firms 
separated according to financial constraints faced in credit market access. 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) follow this strategy appraising the importance of financial 
factors over a non-financial group of firms in United States. This study used firm’s size 
measured through the total assets as the criteria to indicate the firm’s credit market access. 
They chose four firm’s financial indicators to analyze: inventories, sales, short-term debt and 
6coverage ratio.
2 The sales level take into account nonfinancial factors related to changes on 
demand. The inventories levels are set to explain effects related to credit market frictions that 
forbids firms to smooth production when sales decline. The short-term debt considers the 
financing structure role on credit market access. The coverage ratio is a proxy to firm’s 
overall financial positions. After some empirical exercises, Gertler and Gilchrist conclude that 
balance sheet effects can be more relevant form smaller firms. 
Oliveira (2009) undertakes a similar work as Gertler e Gilchrist (1994) adopting the 
firm’s size as a measure of credit market access. This study concentrates on Brazil’s 
economy. The empirical analysis was conducted over a database of public and private firms 
firms between the third quarter of 1994 and the third quarter of 2007. One point to emphasize 
in this article is the addition of some factors in order to describe firm’s characteristics related 
to another agency costs. Besides the usual variables linked to nonfinancial and financial issues 
(operational revenues, inventories, short term debt and coverage ratio), the ratio of market 
value to the book value (Market to Book) and the ratio of fixed assets to total assets are 
considered to capture firm’s growth capacity and level of collateral respectively. Following 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Oliveira (2009) indicate that smaller firms are more sensitive to 
balance sheet effects. 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995, 1998) investigate the influence of fundamental 
(expected return and present value) and financial (availability of internal and external funds) 
factors on firms investment decisions considering capital market imperfections. Among others 
characteristics, the authors adopted the existence of debt rating as a criterion to measure the 
credit market imperfections. According to the authors, considering that most companies that 
issues public debt obtains a bond rating, this strategy permits to split the sample into firms 
that have, or not, issued public debt in the past. If the company didn’t issue debt it must have 
faced more constraints in credit market access. Their empirical analyses indicated that non- 
rating firms are more sensitive to financial factors. 
 
3.  Data 
 
Our data comes from Economática and CVM. We had originally collected balance sheet 
information of 628 non-financial publicly held companies from third quarter of 1994 to third 
quarter of 2009.  
                                                 
2 The ratio of cash flow to total interest payments. 
7For each company, we build the following ratios: Financial Expenses/EBIT
3, Market 
Value/Book Value, Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability, Short Term Debt/Total Assets, Net 
Operational Revenues/Total Assets, and Inventories/Total Assets.  
The ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT and Short Term Debt/Total Assets aim to control 
for firm’s financial position and debt structure respectively. The ratios Market Value/Book 
Value and Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability are set to express agency costs. These four 
financial indicators were used as a proxy to the external finance premium. The ratios Net 
Operational Revenues/Total Assets and Inventories/Total Assets were used to obtain a robust 
business cycle measure over both financial and non financial factors. 
We chose the insolvency and global long-term debt rating as the criterions to measure 
firm’s credit market access. The concept of insolvency adopted was the beginning of a 
bankruptcy or recovery legal procedures. This information was obtained from Bovespa's 
Daily Information Bulletin (Boletim Diário de Informações - BDI) and CVM’s publicly held 
companies register. We defined the default moment the quarter when the firm appeared as 
concordatária
4 in BDI or bankrupted in CVM’s register. We called theses firms “insolvents”. 
We created a dummy variable equal to one if the company was insolvent and zero otherwise. 
The assumption is that firms that became insolvent would have face greater agency costs 
through time.  
The debt rated firms were identified at Fitch Ratings, Moodys and Standard & Poors 
release list. We created a dummy variable for this criteria assigning the value one if the firm 
has a rating for its long term debt released at least in two of the three credit rating agencies 
and zero otherwise. Considering that firms with rating have access to a greater number of 
funding sources, these companies must be less sensitive to credit market imperfections. 
We exclude from our sample: (1) companies that didn’t have in any quarter available 
information to calculate the indicators selected for the analysis; (2) companies from financial 
sectors (banks, insurance companies, etc.), that have a very different financing structure 
comparing to non financial companies; and (3) companies that belong to Telecommunication 
and Electric Energy sectors, that in Brazil are traditionally characterized by a strong resilience 
of business cycle at times of crises.  
Table 1 shows a summary statistics to the total sample and the sample separated 
according to insolvency and rating criterions. Panel A of Table 1 shows the existence of 
outliers into the data. In order to avoid problems we also excluded from the sample 0.2 
                                                 
3 Earnings before interest and taxes. 
4 This is the term in Brazilian Business Recovery Law for companies that have opened a recovery legal 
procedure due to insolvency problems. 
8percentile from all indicators. Panel B of Table 1 displays the data description after the 
outliers’ exclusion. 
After all exclusions, we obtained an unbalanced panel covering 332 firms. Of these, we 
identified 12 insolvent and 37 with rating. Table 2 indicates the amount of firms found in each 
criterion as well the sector it is part of. We adopted Economática’s sector classification. 
Table 3 presents the indicators correlation matrix. With the exception of the correlation 
observed between the ratios Net Operational Revenues/Total Assets and Inventories/Total 
Assets, all the correlations were below 0.1. 
Tables 4 and 5 reveal the test’s results to appraise the difference between the indicators 
averages accordingly with the criterions adopted to measure the firm’s credit market access. 
Comparing solvent and insolvent firms, considering a 10% significance level, the tests 
indicated that the averages of the ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT, Short Term Debt/Total 
Assets, Net Operational Revenues/Total Assets, and Inventories/Total Assets for insolvent 
firms are superior to the averages for the solvent ones. Contrary to this result, the averages of 
the ratios Market Value/Book Value and Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability for solvent firms 
are superior to the averages obtained for the insolvent ones. All this results are as expected. 
Considering the rating criterion, the tests indicated that the average of the ratios Fixed 
Assets/Long-Term Liability, Inventories/Total Assets, Short Term Debt/Total Assets, and Net 
Operational Revenues/Total Assets for firms without rating are superior to the averages 
obtained for the ones with rating. In the case of the ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT and 
Market Value/Book Value the averages for the firms with rating are superior to the average 
obtained for the ones without rating. Although the results found for the ratios Fixed 
Assets/Long-Term Liability and Financial Expenses/EBIT were unlike the expected, they can 
be minimized considering that the medians for firms with and without rating are very similar.
5 
Due to the small amount of insolvent companies in our sample we employed the Kaplan 
Meier estimator as a non-parametric test to confirm the parametric tests results.
6 Figure 2 
displays the result of Kaplan Meier estimator to the total sample. Figure 3 contains the result 
of Kaplan Meier estimator splitting the sample between solvent and insolvent firms. 
The results of this test show that the probability for companies to go from solvent to 
insolvent state decreases as times goes by. This dynamic demonstrates the greater insolvency 
probability expected for younger companies, which in turn poses one of the primitive factors 
related to firm’s credit market access commented by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994)
7. As a 
                                                 
5 This can be observed in Table 1. 
6 According to Torabi and Ding (1998), non parametric tests are indicated in small sample environments. 
7 Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) enhance that the informational frictions that affects the external finance premium 
apply mainly to younger firms, firms with a high degree of idiosyncratic risk, and firms that are not well 
9second result, the Kaplan Meier estimator between insolvent firms is very different from the 
measure obtained for the solvent firms and total sample. 
 
4.  Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1.  The relationship between the external finance premium and the default 
probability 
 
According to credit channel’s theory there is an inversely proportional relationship 
between the firm’s financial position and the external finance premium. Furthermore, many 
researchers have demonstrated that commonly used indicators to denote the firm’s balance 
sheet condition has predictive power to identify the credit risk in corporative sector
8. These 
relationships suggest the existence of common factors between the external finance premium 
and the firm’s default probability. 
In order to test this hypothesis we applied the non-linear probability models Logit and 
Complementary Log Log to relate the insolvency dummy variable and the indicators selected 
to denote the credit market imperfections. The result of this exercise could present favorable 
evidences to the use of insolvency as a criterion to measure credit market access and confirm 
the indicators selected to denote the external finance premium dynamic. 
The Logit regression is the commonly used technique in bankruptcy prediction, 
presenting advantages over others techniques
9. In order for its implementation, the dependent 
variable suffers a logistic transformation, been converted in an odds ratio and after in a log 
base variable
10. Our Logit model has the following form:  
 







std cl mb fee i
p
p
5 4 3 2 1 0 1
ln           (1) 
 
where: 
i= The ratio Inventories/Total Assets, in order to denote business cycle dynamics;  
fee= The ratio Financial Expenses/EBIT (the inverse of coverage ratio), in order to 
control for firms financial position; 
                                                                                                                                                       
collateralized. They justify the use of the firm’s size criterion to split their sample of companies asserting that the 
firm’s size is strong correlated with this three “primitive factors”. 
8 Sanvincente and Minardi (1998) and Brito and Neto (2008) are some of the papers that presented researches 
that used some indicators usually related to credit market imperfections to bankruptcy prediction in Brazil. 
9 Brito e Neto (2008). 
10 The logistic transformation has the following form: Pr(d=1/X) = exp(Xβ)/(1+ exp(Xβ)). 
10mb= The ratio Market Value/Book Value (Market to Book), in order to control to the 
growth potential that the market attributes for companies; 
cl = The ratio Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability, in order to control for the level of 
collateral available as a guarantee for new and actual loans; 
std  = The ratio Short Term Debt/Total Assets, in order to control for the firm’s 
financing structure;  
ν  = random error component. 
According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), the Complementary Log Log regression is 
more appropriate when one of the outcomes is rare.
11 This technique assumes an asymmetric 
distribution for the random error component. In order for its implementation the dependent 
variable also suffers a transformation, been converted in a set of exponential terms and after 
in a log base variable.
12 Our Complementary Log Log model has the following form: 
 
ν β β β β β β + + + + + + = − − std cl mb fee i p 5 4 3 2 1 0 )) 1 ln( ln(        (2) 
 
We estimated the equations as a pool of cross sections and allowing for intragroup 
correlation in standard errors (cluster robust standard errors). Table 6 displays the estimated 
coefficients for the Logit and Complementary Log Log regressions. The results were very 
similar. With the exception of the ratio Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability, both models 
presented all variables significant at 10% level. Under credit channel’s background, all the 
coefficients revealed the expected signal. 
The coefficients of the ratios Market Value/Book Value and Fixed Assets/Long Term 
Liability have a negative signal. This indicates that the higher the value of this indicators, the 
smaller the default probability. The coefficients of the ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT, Short 
Term Debt/Total Assets, and Inventories/Total Assets have a positive signal. This indicates 
that the higher the value of this indicators, the higher the default probability. Among all the 
independent variables the ratio Inventories/Total Assets presented the higher coefficient. 
Figures 4 and 6 display these relationships in a clearly way. For each indicator we 
calculated the default’s conditional probability keeping the others equal to the average. In 
others words, the figures presents the default’s conditional probability for a representative 
                                                 
11 Typically, the Logit regression is more accurate to measure marginal effects and obtain probability prediction 
when the analyzed events have a proportion close to ½. Considering that in our final sample we have identified 
just 12 insolvent firms against 320 solvent firms, providing 92 insolvency events against 6690 solvency events, 
the application of this technique for comparing effects is recommended.  
12 The Complementary Log Log transformation has the form: Pr(d=1/X) =1- exp(-exp(Xβ)). For small values of 
probability, the Complementary Log Log transformation is close to the logistic transformation. As this 
probability increases, the transformation approaches infinity more slowly than logistic transformation. 
11firm with an average value for all the indicators except the one that is emphasized. For each 
indicator the probabilities obtained from both Logit and Complementary Log Log model can 
be compared.  
4.2.  Inventories and the external finance premium 
 
In order to appraise the relationship between inventories and the external finance 
premium we employed the two stage dynamic panel data model developed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), also known as System GMM. This method is an 
extension of the Arellano-Bond estimator.
13 
The System GMM combines the original equation at first differences from Arellano-
Bond estimator with an equation at levels in a system of equations and employs both lagged 
levels and differences as instruments. This strategy permits to solve problems that arise in 
Arellano-Bond estimator when instruments are weakly correlated with the independent 
variables.
14  
We chose the ratio Inventories/Total Assets to denote the corporative business cycle 
variable. We estimated a first order univariate process (AR (1)) for this variable using the 
total sample (1994Q3-2009Q3) and we obtained a coefficient for the autoregressive term 
around 0.3, demonstrating some persistence degree in this ratio
15. This result implies that the 
first difference of the ratio Inventories/Total Assets must present a lower correlation with the 
lags in level, what could result in weak instruments’ problems. In our exercise, the time 
dimension couldn’t be considered small, reducing the risk of bias. Nevertheless, we believe 
that using System GMM we can at least obtain an efficiency gain. The next equation presents 
our base model:  
 
it i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i STD CL MB FEE NOR I I ν η δ β β β β β β + + + + + + + + = − − − − − 1 , 6 1 , 5 1 , 4 1 , 3 , 2 1 , 1 0 , (3) 
 
                                                 
13 Holt-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) developed the Arellano-Bond estimator, 
also known as Difference GMM. 
14A recognized and widespread fact in dynamic panel data models’ literature is that the larger the series 
persistence, the lower the correlation between the first difference of this series and the lag of levels. In turn, the 
use of weak instruments affects the performance of the Arellano-Bond estimator in large and small samples. In 
large samples, the variance of the estimated coefficients increases asymptotically. In small samples, particularly 
when the time dimension is reduced, the use of weak instruments may provide bias in coefficients. The System 
GMM supposes additional assumptions to Arellano-Bond estimator, like the inexistence of correlation between 
the first difference of instrumental variables and the fixed effects. This assumption allows the use of more 
instruments, providing estimation advantages comparing with its precursor. Bobba and Coviello (2006) and 
Biondi e Toneto (2008) enhances this points originally raised by Blundell and Bond (1998). Roodman (2009) 
provides a revision of GMM dynamic panel data model and shows how to implement these estimators with 
Stata. 





t i I , = The ratio Inventories/Total Assets, in order to denote business cycle dynamics; 
t i NOR , = The ratio Net Operational Revenues/Total Assets, in order to control for non 
financial factors that could explain differences in firms with different levels of credit market 
access;
16 
t i FEE , = The ratio Financial Expenses/EBIT (the inverse of coverage ratio), in order to 
control for firms financial position. This is our balance sheet variable; 
t i MB, = The ratio Market Value/Book Value (Market to Book), in order to control to 
the growth potential that the market attributes for companies; 
t i CL , = The ratio Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability, in order to control for the level of 
collateral available as a guarantee for new and actual loans; 
t i STD ,  = The ratio Short Term Debt/Total Assets, in order to control for the firm’s 
financing structure; 
i η = firm’s fixed effect; 
it ν  = random error component. 
 
We avoided seasonality problems considering all variables as changes over the same 
quarter of the past year. In order to remove universal time related shocks from the errors we 
included time dummies in the model.
17 All the specifications were estimated with robust and 
Windmeijer correction for standard errors. The model is subject to the following assumptions: 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( = × = × = js it i it it E E E ν ν η ν ν  for all  j i s t j i ≠ , , , , .  
Besides the lag of the ratio Inventories/Total Assets, we also treat the ratio Net 
Operational Revenues/Total Assets as a predetermined variable. In this way, in order to 
validate the System GMM instruments, the following additional moment conditions must be 
satisfied:  0 ) ( 1 , = Δ − it t i v I E , for all  T t ,..., 3 = ;  0 )) ( ( 1 , = + Δ − it i t i v I E η , for all  T t ,..., 4 = ; 
0 ) ( 1 , = Δ − it t i v NOR E  for all  T t ,..., 2 = ; and  0 )) ( ( 1 , = + Δ − it i t i v NOR E η  for all  T t ,..., 3 = ; 
where  Δ denotes the first difference operator. This identification strategy permits some 
                                                 
16 Gertler e Gilchrist (1994) enhance that non financial factors, such as contracting out and others industry 
effects, could explain changes in firm’s business cycle. In this way, including controls for these non financial 
factors would provide a better measure of variations in firm’s business cycle due to financial factors. 
17 According to Roodman (2009), the inclusion of time dummies make more likely the assumption that the errors 
are not correlated across them. 
13advantages. Allowing these weak exogeneity assumptions the inventories can be viewed as a 
forward-looking variable that takes into account the expected level of inventories and 
demand.  
Besides the “internal instruments”
18, we also include time dummies and the short term 
nominal interest rate (Selic) as instruments. In order to avoid the instrument proliferation, the 
instruments were limited to two lags.
19 
Table 7 displays the estimated parameters. The Hansen test has as null hypothesis the 
validity of the instruments. The Difference-in-Hansen test has as null hypothesis the validity 
of the additional System GMM moment conditions. Both tests don’t reject the null 
hypothesis.
20 Considering a 90% confidence level, the ratios Net Operational Revenues/Total 
Assets, Market Value/Book Value and Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability didn’t present 
statistically significant coefficients.  
The lag of the ratio Inventories/Total Assets presented a significant coefficient with a 
value between zero and one (0.339). This result indicates that the firm’s inventories level 
follows a stationary process and demonstrates persistence in its dynamic. 
The ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT and Short Term Debt/Total Assets also presented 
significant coefficients with positive signal. The higher these ratios, the higher the 
sensitiveness of business cycle measured by the dynamics of inventories.  
The others indicators didn’t present coefficient statistically significant.  
 
4.3.  The corporative business cycle sensitiveness according to firm’s   credit 
market access 
 
We analyzed the corporative business cycle sensitiveness accordingly to firm’s credit 
market access, measured by insolvency and global long-term debt rating. Firms that face more 
constraints in credit market access must demonstrate greater sensitiveness to balance sheet 
effects. In order to test this hypothesis we created the following dummies variables: 
 
•  D: dummy variable equal to one if the firm have became insolvent during the 
period and zero otherwise; 
•  r: dummy variable equal to one if the firm obtained a rating for its long term 
debt and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
18 The lagged levels and the lagged differences from the predetermined variables. 
19 According to Cameron e Trivedi (2005), for moderate or large time dimension there may be a maximum lag of 
the dependent variable that is used as an instrument, such as not more than its fourth lag. 
20 Both tests Hansen and Difference-in-Hansen lose confidence as the number of instruments increases. 
However, we did these tests for a reduced number of instruments and the validity was remained. 
14 
For each criterion we built a specification of the base model presented in last section 
including an interaction term obtained from the cross product between the dummies variable 
and the indicators related to credit market access. We are interested in the significance and 
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The specifications were estimated just for the period following the economic policy 
tripod establishment. 
Considering the specification (4), that includes a dummy variable equal to one for 
insolvent firms, we expect that the interaction term present the same signal of the respective 
indicator. Regarding the specification (5), that includes a dummy variable equal to one for 
debt rate firms, we expect that the interaction term present the opposite signal of the 
respective indicator. We will take these results as evidences of balance sheet effects, which 
amplify the monetary policy shocks over corporative business cycle. 
Table 9 reveals the estimated parameters. All the indicators coefficients kept the 
significance and signal observed in base model. In order to appraise the significance of the 
interaction term and respective indicator, besides the individual significance test, we also 
applied the Wald test to assess the jointly significance of the variables. Tables 10 and 11 
summarize the tests results and coefficients of these variables.  
We classified the coefficients according to significance and signal obtained. The 
coefficients that presented individual or joint significance with the expected signal were 
classified as “valid” (V). The coefficients that presented individual or joint significance with 
signal against our expectation were classified as “not valid” (NV). The coefficients that didn’t 
present individual or joint significance were classified as “not conclusive” (NC). 
In the specification considering the insolvency criterion, we obtained valid results for 
the ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT and Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability. The ratio Market 
15Value/Book Value presented a not conclusive result. The ratio Short Term Debt/Total Assets 
presented a not valid result. In the specification considering the rating criterion, the ratios 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability and Short Term Debt/Total Assets presented valid results. 
The other ratios presented not conclusive results. Except for the ratio Market Value/Book 
Value, all the ratios presented at least one valid result at the adopted criterions. 
 
5.  Robustness Analysis 
 
In order to appraise the dynamic panel data model that we have presented in last section, 
we conducted four experiments in this section:  
 
1.  We estimated the model preceding and following the economic policy 
“tripod” establishment in Brazil, based on primary fiscal surplus, inflation 
targets and free-floating exchange rate. This period consider the sample after 
the fourth quarter of 1999; 
2.  We analyzed the “BNDES” effect; 
3.  We analyzed inventories sensitiveness accordingly with the sectors. 
 
The specifications constructed in order to appraise these experiments are presented next. 
They followed the same assumptions and instruments’ rule choice assumed in base model.  
5.1  The relationship between the corporative business cycle and the external finance 
premium preceding and following the establishment of the economic policy “tripod” in 
Brazil 
 
We estimated the base model preceding and following the economic policy “tripod” 
establishment in Brazil, based on primary fiscal surplus, inflation targets and free-floating 
exchange rate. This issue is important for credit channel, once the monetary policy suffered 
significant changes after this event. Table 8 displays the results for both specifications. 
The only significant variables in the period preceding the tripod establishment were the 
lag of the dependent variable and the ratio Net Operational Revenues/Total Assets. The 
coefficients of indicators introduced to denote the external finance premium weren’t 
significant. 
In the period following the tripod establishment, considering a 90% confidence level, 
only the ratio Net Operational Revenues/Total Assets didn’t present a significant coefficient. 
The coefficients of all ratios related with external finance premium were significant and 
16presented signal as expected. We interpreted this result as evidence that the credit channel 
gained strength after the tripod establishment. 
 
5.2  The “BNDES effect” analysis  
 
A particular feature about Brazil’s credit market is the involvement of BNDES (The 
Brazilian Development Bank). This institution is a key player in the implementation of 
government’s industrial policy and the main long term financing provider. The funds offered 
by BNDES have better cost and maturity conditions compared with other financing agents 
from Brazil’s credit market. Furthermore, the long term interest rate charged for funds 
obtained in the development bank
21 are just marginally affected by the short term interest rate 
that Central Bank controls. In such a context, firms that have more access to BNDES funds 
must present more resilience to external finance premium variation. 
In order to evaluate this hypothesis we used the same method applied in last 
subsection. We collected available information about BNDES’s direct operations and 
identified in our sample the firms that obtained finance lines for large-scale investment 
projects in the institution. Table 12 reveals these companies according to its sector. We used 
this information to create the following dummy variable: 
 
•  BNDES: dummy variable equal to one if the firm obtained finance line for 
large-scale investments and zero otherwise. 
 
The equation (6) denotes a model specification including the interaction term 
calculated as the cross product between the dummy variable and the indicators related to 
balance sheet effects: 
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) * ( ) * (
) * (
1 , 10
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 (6) 
 
Once again, we are interested in the significance and signal of the interaction terms and 
respective indicators. Due to the rule considered in the dummy variable creation, we expect 
that the interaction terms present the opposite signal revealed by the indicators. This result 
would indicate that firms in our sample that obtained funds with BNDES to finance large-
scale investments presented more resilience to credit market imperfections. 
                                                 
21 TJLP – Taxa de Juros de Longo Prazo (Long Term Interest Rate). 
17Table 13 shows the estimated parameters. We also estimated this specification for the 
period after the tripod establishment in Brazil. Comparing these results with the ones that we 
obtained in the base model estimation, the ratio Financial Expenses/EBIT was the only 
indicator that lost significance.  
Table 14 summarizes the coefficients and significance tests for the indicators related to 
credit market imperfections. We classified the indicators following the same rule applied in 
the experiment from the last subsection: the coefficients that presented individual or joint 
significance with the expected signal were classified as “valid” (V). The coefficients that 
presented individual or joint significance with signal against our expectation were classified 
as “not valid” (NV). The coefficients that didn’t present individual or joint significance were 
classified as “not conclusive” (NC). 
While the ratio Financial Expenses/EBIT didn’t present individual significance, the 
Wald test pointed that the indicator and its interaction term are jointly significant. With this 
result, we considered the ratio Financial Expenses/EBIT as valid. We also obtained a valid 
result for the ratio Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability. The others ratios presented not 
conclusive results. 
 
5.3  The sector’s corporative business cycle sensitiveness 
 
After the identification of a credit channel working, the discussions must be addressed 
to micro issues. In such context the knowledge about how the different sectors in economy 
behave facing credit market imperfections grows in importance for monetary and industrial 
policies. In order to contribute with this issue, in this subsection we intend to rank the sectors 
accordingly with the sensitiveness to the external finance premium. 
Our sample represents 15 sectors: agriculture and fisheries, foods and beverages, retail, 
construction, electro-electronics, industrial machinery, mining, non-metallic minerals, pulp 
and paper, oil and gas, chemical, metallurgy and steelmaking, textile, transportation, and 
vehicles and spare parts. Following the methodology applied in last subsections, we 
calculated interaction terms crossing a dummy variable created for each sector in our sample 
with the indicators related to the credit market imperfections. 
In order to obtain the sector’s sensitiveness we estimated one specification for each 
sector. We kept the same indicators and instruments in all specifications to provide 
comparable results. The equation (7) denotes the general specification:  
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The dummy sector is represented in equation with the term “S”. After we evaluate the 
coefficient’s significance of the indicator and interaction terms, we added the coefficients if 
they were individually or jointly significant (“valid” – V) and disregard if they didn’t present 
significant coefficients (“not conclusive” – NC). 
Due to space restrictions, we opted to expose just the coefficients indicators related to 
credit market imperfections and interaction terms for each sector’s specification.
22 
Summarizing the results that we didn’t present, in all specifications the coefficient of the ratio 
Inventories/Total Assets have kept the significance, positive signal and value between zero 
and one. The ratio Net Operational Revenues/Total assets remained not significant. The 
Hansen and Difference-in-Hansen tests have continued to indicate the validity of instruments 
and System GMM moments conditions. 
Tables 15 to 18 denote the estimated parameters for the ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT, 
Market Value/Book Value, Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability, and Short Term Debt/Total 
Assets. Tables 19 and 20 reveal for each indicator the sector’s ranking classification 
according to the total marginal effect obtained adding the coefficients of the indicator itself 
and respective interaction term. 
The sector that appeared in more ranks with positive sensitiveness was the textile, with 
three indicators (Market Value/Book Value, Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability, and Short 
Term Debt/Total Assets). The sectors that appeared two times were foods and beverages 
(Financial Expenses/EBIT and Short Term Debt/Total Assets), chemical (Financial 
Expenses/EBIT and Market Value/Book Value), transportation (Market Value/Book Value 
and Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability), vehicles and spare parts (Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability and Short Term Debt/Total Assets), and paper and pulp (Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability and Short Term Debt/Total Assets). The sectors agriculture and fisheries (Financial 
Expenses/EBIT), electro-electronics (Market Value/Book Value), and construction (Fixed 
Assets/Long-Term Liability) appeared once. 
The sectors that appeared in more ranks with negative signal were electro-electronics 
(Financial Expenses/EBIT and Short Term Debt/Total Assets), construction (Financial 
Expenses/EBIT and Market Value/Book Value), retail (Market Value/Book Value and Fixed 
Assets/Long-Term Liability), foods and beverages (Market Value/Book Value and Fixed 
                                                 
22 We can provide these results at request. 
19Assets/Long-Term Liability), and agriculture and fisheries (Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability 
and Short Term Debt/Total Assets). The sectors mining (Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability), 
paper and pulp (Financial Expenses/EBIT), and metallurgy and steelmaking (Fixed 
Assets/Long-Term Liability), appeared just once. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we investigated the relationship between the external finance premium and 
firm’s default probability and appraised in different levels the sensitivity of corporative 
business cycle to the external finance premium. 
Using Logit and Complementary Log Log regressions we found that some commonly 
indicators used to express the external finance premium present an explanatory power for the 
firm’s default probability. We interpret this result as evidence supporting the insolvency as a 
good proxy to credit market access and the external finance premium. This result is important 
once we didn’t identify the use of this criterion in literature. 
We used the System GMM estimator to appraise the relationship between the business 
cycle and external finance premium. The additional moment conditions that this estimator 
assumes permits to avoid weak instruments’ problems arising when variables with persistence 
are employed. Moreover, our identification strategy allowed us to treat inventories as a 
forward- looking variable considering the expected inventory itself and sales. This strategy 
avoided us to assume the stronger assumption of exogeneity between inventories and sales.  
When we estimated the base model splitting our sample preceding and following the 
tripod establishment in Brazil, we found results indicating a stronger credit channel after this 
event. Considering that after this event the Brazilian credit market have developed 
significantly, assuming a trajectory of reduction for interest rates and expansion in credit 
volume, this result seems coherent. This also indicates a better effectiveness of monetary 
policy through credit channel in the more recent period. 
We also found results showing that firms with direct operations in BNDES presents 
business cycle less sensitive to the indicators that we used as proxy for external finance 
premium. We considered this result favorable evidence to the fact that, once the long term 
interest rate charged for BNDES funds are just marginally affected by the short term interest 
rate that Central Bank controls, the expansion of this funds in economy weakens the monetary 
policy power. Also, the indicators that presented a valid relationship in this exercise were the 
ones linked to firm’s financial position and capacity to provide collateral. We considered this 
result intuitive once the better condition of BNDES funds and the use of these resources for 
20investments must provide a better financial condition and capacity to new investments, easing 
the balance sheet effects over the firms.  
Our analyses using the insolvency and the existence of rating for firm’s long term debt 
to separate the sample according to the credit market access indicated that insolvent and no 
rating firms are more sensitive to the external finance premium. Companies that face different 
levels of constraints in credit market access demonstrate a different response to monetary 
policy shocks through credit channel.  
For us, the results in this paper make it clear as well as confirm previous results in the 
literature, such as Oliveira (2009), showing that the balance sheet channel is relevant in Brazil 
to explain the effects of monetary policy on the real sector of the economy.  
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24Table 1 – Financial indicator’s descriptive statistics 
 
Firms  N  µ  s  min  25%  50%  75%  max 
Total Sample 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  10072  0,60  126,57  -2539  -0,36  0,33  1,15  11321,6 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
10976  1,89  14,07  -323,99  0,37  0,85  1,81  985,2 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
14189  6,85  115,56  6,9E-05  0,57  1,31  2,51  8528,8 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  14923  1,53  71,55  3,8E-07  0,19  0,31  0,49  8555,3 
Inventories/Total Assets  11974  0,11  0,10  3,3E-06  3,1E-02  9,6E-02  0,17  0,72 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  11247  0,22  0,24  -14,02  0,10  0,19  0,28  2,00 
Solvents 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  9915  0,58  127,56  -2539  -0,35  0,33  1,14  11321,6 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
9650  1,79  10,06  -323,99  0,37  0,86  1,84  501,6 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
12500  6,17  88,75  6,9E-05  0,51  1,33  2,60  5349,0 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  13199  1,68  76,08  3,8E-07  0,20  0,32  0,51  8555,3 
Inventories/Total Assets  10441  0,13  9,8E-02  3,3E-06  5,4E-02  1,13E-01  0,18  0,72 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  9755  0,23  0,25  -14,02  0,11  0,20  0,30  2,00 
Insolvents 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  157  1,79  11,00  -24,16  -0,92  0,38  2,28  88,92 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
125  -0,26  5,39  -32,36  -0,42  -5,7E-02  0,50  13,54 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
197  0,94  0,89  7,7E-03  0,22  0,73  1,47  7,18 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  197  0,89  1,51  0,10  0,38  0,58  0,86  13,88 
Inventories/Total Assets  183  0,15  0,12  3,13E-04  6,4E-02  9,3E-02  0,24  0,52 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  158  0,27  0,22  -0,20  1,3E-01  0,23  0,40  1,05 
With rating 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  1097  6,16E-01  17,24  -289,25  0,06  0,33  0,95  334,33 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
1172  2,17  3,58  -26,42  0,73  1,51  2,78  73,18 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
1206  1,97  5,16  1,7E-03  0,81  1,31  2,00  138,02 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  1240  0,26  0,30  3,8E-07  0,16  0,23  0,31  9,75 
Inventories/Total Assets  1176  0,10  8,3E-02  1,4E-03  4,1E-02  8,4E-02  0,14  0,51 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  1087  0,20  0,18  -8,3E-06  0,10  0,17  0,23  1,25 
No rating 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  8975  5,94E-01  133,95  -3E+03  -4,7E-01  0,33  1,19  11321,60 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
8603  1,71  10,59  -323,99  0,33  0,78  1,67  501,59 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
11491  6,52  92,55  6,9E-05  0,46  1,32  2,67  5349,00 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  12156  1,82  79,28  1,9E-05  0,20  0,34  0,54  8555,29 
Inventories/Total Assets  9448  0,13  9,9E-02  3,3E-06  5,7E-02  1,16E-01  0,19  0,72 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  8826  0,23  0,25  -1,4E+01  0,11  0,21  0,31  2,00 













25Table 1– Financial indicator’s descriptive statistics (continuation) 
 
Firms  N  µ  s  min  25%  50%  75%  max 
Total Sample 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  10032  -0,12  13,66  -264,1  -0,35  0,33  1,15  145,9 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
9745  1,58  3,96  -22,72  0,37  0,85  1,81  73,2 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
12651  3,24  11,32  7,9E-04  0,51  1,32  2,56  385,2 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  13244  0,44  0,54  1,9E-04  0,20  0,32  0,51  7,8 
Inventories/Total Assets  10591  0,13  0,10  2,2E-05  5,4E-02  1,12E-01  0,18  0,5 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  9869  0,23  0,18  -0,05  0,11  0,20  0,30  1,7 
Solvents 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  9875  -0,15  13,70  -264,1  -0,34  0,33  1,14  145,9 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
9622  1,60  3,96  -22,72  0,38  0,86  1,83  73,18 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
12454  3,28  11,41  7,9E-04  0,51  1,33  2,59  385,2 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  13050  0,43  0,54  1,9E-04  0,20  0,32  0,50  7,8 
Inventories/Total Assets  10410  0,13  0,10  2,2E-05  5,4E-02  1,12E-01  0,18  0,48 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  9713  0,23  0,18  -0,05  0,11  0,20  0,30  1,72 
Insolvents 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  157  1,79  11,00  -24,16  -0,92  0,38  2,28  88,92 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
123  0,23  3,81  -20,60  -0,42  -4,6E-02  0,50  13,54 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
197  0,94  0,89  7,7E-03  0,22  0,73  1,47  7,18 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  194  0,73  0,67  0,10  0,37  0,57  0,81  5,92 
Inventories/Total Assets  181  0,14  0,11  3,1E-04  6,4E-02  9,2E-02  0,24  0,47 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  156  0,28  0,21  2,1E-04  0,13  0,23  0,40  1,05 
With rating 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  1095  5,8E-01  10,92  -208,69  0,06  0,33  0,95  144,40 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
1170  2,22  3,40  -13,04  0,73  1,52  2,78  73,18 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
1206  1,97  5,16  1,7E-03  0,81  1,31  2,00  138,02 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  1231  0,25  0,13  3,3E-04  0,17  0,23  0,32  0,88 
Inventories/Total Assets  1174  0,10  0,08  1,4E-03  4,1E-02  8,4E-02  0,14  0,44 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  1087  0,20  0,18  -8,3E-06  0,10  0,17  0,23  1,25 
No rating 
Financial Expenses/EBIT  8937  -2,1E-01  13,96  -3E+02  -4,6E-01  0,33  1,18  145,94 
Market Value/Book 
Value 
8575  1,50  4,02  -22,72  0,33  0,78  1,66  72,14 
Fixed Assets/Long-Term 
Liability 
11445  3,38  11,78  7,9E-04  0,47  1,32  2,66  385,24 
Short Term Debt/Total Assets  12013  0,46  0,56  1,9E-04  0,20  0,34  0,53  7,76 
Inventories/Total Assets  9417  0,13  0,10  2,2E-05  5,7E-02  1,16E-01  0,19  0,48 
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets  8782  0,23  0,18  -5,3E-02  0,11  0,21  0,31  1,72 
* We excluded 0.2 percentiles from the financial 
indicators. 
Panel B: Data description - without outilers* 
 
Note: We have obtained our data on Economática and CVM databases. Our database consist of a unbalanced 
panel data formed with information of non financial publicly held companies listed at Bovespa from third quarter 











































































320 12 37 295
 
Note: We exclude from our sample: (1) companies that didn’t have in any quarter available information to 
calculate the indicators selected for the analysis; (2) financial sector companies (banks, insurance companies, 
etc.), that have a very different financing structure comparing to non financial companies; and (3) companies that 
belong to Telecommunication and Electric Energy sectors, that in Brazil are traditionally characterized by a 
strong resilience of business cycle at times of crises. Besides that, in order to avoid problems we exclude from 
the sample 0.2 percentile from all indicators. After all exclusions we obtained an unbalanced panel covering 332 
firms. Of these, we identified 12 insolvent and 37 with debt rate. Table 2 indicates the amount of firms found in 
































-0,0342 -0,0486 -0,0424 1
Inventories/ Total 
Assets
-0,0115 0,0397 0,0062 0,072 1
Net Op. Revenues/  
Total Assets




Table 4 – Equality test of the mean: solvents x insolvents 
Financial Expenses/EBIT
p Value
(HA: μs- μi ≠ 0) (HA: μs- μi < 0) (HA: μs- μi > 0)
Total sample 10032 -0,12
Solvents 9875 -0,15 0,077 0,038 0,962
Insolvents 157 1,79
Firms N μ







29Table 4 – Equality test of the mean: solvents x insolvents (continuation) 
p Value
(HA: μs- μi ≠ 0) (HA: μs- μi < 0) (HA: μs- μi > 0)
Total sample 9745 1,58
Solvents 9622 1,60 0,000 1,000 0,000
Insolvents 123 0,23
p Value
(HA: μs- μi ≠ 0) (HA: μs- μi < 0) (HA: μs- μi > 0)
Total sample 12651 3,24
Solvents 12454 3,28 0,004 0,998 0,002
Insolvents 197 0,94
p Value
(HA: μs- μi ≠ 0) (HA: μs- μi < 0) (HA: μs- μi > 0)
Total sample 13244 0,44
Solvents 13050 0,43 0,000 0,000 1,000
Insolvents 194 0,73
p Value
(HA: μs- μi ≠ 0) (HA: μs- μi < 0) (HA: μs- μi > 0)
Total sample 10591 0,128
Solvents 10410 0,127 0,015 0,007 0,993
Insolvents 181 0,145
p Value
(HA: μs- μi ≠ 0) (HA: μs- μi < 0) (HA: μs- μi > 0)
Total sample 9869 0,229
Solvents 9713 0,228 0,001 0,000 1,000
Insolvents 156 0,278









Short Term Debt/Total Assets
Firms N
 
Note: Table 4 reveals the test’s results to appraise the difference between the indicators means accordingly with 
the insolvency criteria. The null hypothesis that insolvent and solvent firms have indicators with the same mean 
are appraised against three alternative hypothesis: the means are equal; the mean for insolvent firms is larger 
than solvent firms; and the mean of insolvent firms is lower than solvent firms. 
30Table 5 – Equality test of the mean: rating x no rating firms. 
Financial Expenses/EBIT
p Value
(HA: μnr- μr≠0) (HA: μnr- μr<0) (HA: μnr- μr>0)
Total sample 10032 -0,12
Rating 1095 0,58 0,073 0,037 0,964
No rating 8937 -0,21
p Value
(HA: μnr- μr≠0) (HA: μnr- μr<0) (HA: μnr- μr>0)
Total sample 9745 1,58
Rating 1170 2,22 0,000 0,000 1,000
No rating 8575 1,50
p Value
(HA: μnr- μr≠0) (HA: μnr- μr<0) (HA: μnr- μr>0)
Total sample 12651 3,24
Rating 1206 1,97 0,000 1,000 0,000
No rating 11445 3,38
p Value
(HA: μnr- μr≠0) (HA: μnr- μr<0) (HA: μnr- μr>0)
Total sample 13244 0,44
Rating 1231 0,25 0,000 1,000 0,000
No rating 12013 0,46
p Value
(HA: μnr- μr≠0) (HA: μnr- μr<0) (HA: μnr- μr>0)
Total sample 10591 0,13
Rating 1174 0,10 0,000 1,000 0,000

















31Table 5 – Equality test of the mean: rating x no rating firms. (continuation) 
p Value
(HA: μnr- μr≠0) (HA: μnr- μr<0) (HA: μnr- μr>0)
Total sample 9869 0,23
Rating 1087 0,20 0,000 1,000 0,000
No rating 8782 0,23
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets
Firms N μ
 
Note: Table 5 reveal the test’s results to appraise the difference between the indicators means accordingly with 
the rating criteria. The null hypothesis that rating and no rating firms have indicators with the same mean are 
appraised against three alternative hypothesis: the means are equal; the mean for rating firms is larger than no 






























































Figure 3 – Kaplan Meier function appraising the default probability to event’s duration between solvent 
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Note: Due to the small amount of insolvent companies we employed the Kaplan Meier estimator as a non 
parametric test to confirm the parametric tests results. According to Torabi and Ding (1998), non parametric tests 
are indicated in small sample environments. Figure 2 displays the result of Kaplan Meier estimator to the total 
sample. Figure 3 contains the result of Kaplan Meier estimator splitting the sample between solvent and 
insolvent firms. The results of this test show that the probability for companies to go from solvent to insolvent 
state decreases as times goes by. This dynamics demonstrate the greater insolvency probability expected for 
younger companies, which in turn poses one of the primitive factors related to firm’s credit market access 
commented by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994). As a second result, the Kaplan Meier estimator between insolvent 
firms is very different from the measure obtained for the solvent firms and total sample. 
33Table 6 – Non linear probability models to appraise the existence of common factors between the external 
finance premium and the firm’s default probability  
Model Logit Complementary Log Log:
Dependent Variable ln(p/(1-p)) ln(-ln(1-p))
Constant -4,067 -4,037
( 0,000 ) ( 0,000 )
Financial Expenses/EBIT 0,0104 0,010
( 0,024)  ( 0,023) 
Market Value/Book Value -0,148 -0,132
( 0,011) ( 0,000)
Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability -0,822 -0,831
( 0,107 ) ( 0,118 )
Short Term Debt/Total Assets 0,336 0,317
( 0,033 ) ( 0,021 )
Inventories/Total Assets 4,934 4,705
( 0,087 ) ( 0,069 )
Wald chi-quadrado(5) 26,43 26,43
Sample 3Q1994 - 3Q2009 3Q1994 - 3Q2009  
Note: We estimated the equations as a pool of cross sections and allowing for intragroup correlation in standard 
errors (cluster robust standard errors). Table 6 displays the estimated coefficients for the Logit and 
Complementary Log Log regressions. The results were very similar. With the exception of the ratio Fixed 
Assets/Long-Term Liability, both models present all variables significant at 10% level. Appraising this result 



















34Figure 4 – Graphs for the conditional default’s probability evaluated at averages:  
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Figure 5 – Graphs for the conditional default’s probability evaluated at averages:  
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Note: For each indicator we calculated the default’s conditional probability keeping the others equal to the 
averages. Figures 4 to 6 display these relationships. In others words, the figures presents the default’s conditional 
probability for a representative firm with an average value for all the indicators except the one that is 
emphasized. For each indicator the probabilities obtained from both Logit and Complementary Log Log model 
can be compared. We can note that the higher the ratios Financial Expenses/EBIT, Short Term Debt/Total 
Assets, and Inventories/Total Assets, the higher the default’s probability. The ratios Market Value/Book Value 
and Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability present an inverse relation with the default’s probability. 
35Table 7 – Base model: dynamic panel data model: studying the relationship between the corporative 



















Autocorrelation test A. Bond
(1
a. order) / (2
a. order)





Market Value/Book Value (-1)
Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability (-1)





Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets
 
 
Note: We estimated a two stage dynamic panel data model developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), also known as System GMM, in order to appraise the relationship between the 
corporative business cycle and the external finance premium. We avoid seasonality problems considering all 
variables as changes over the same quarter of the past year. In order to remove universal time related shocks 
from the errors we include time dummies in the model. All the specifications were estimated with robust and 
Windmeijer correction for standard errors. Besides the lag of the ratio Inventories/Total Assets, we also treat the 
ratio Net Operational Revenues/Total Assets as a predetermined variable. Besides the “internal instruments”, we 
also include the time dummies and the short term nominal interest rate (Selic) as instruments. In order to avoid 





36Table 8 – Base model estimated preceding and following the economic policy “tripod” establishment in 


















Autocorrelation test A. Bond
(1
a. order) / (2
a. order)
Total number of instruments 60 165
n = 70 n = 214
4Q94 - 4Q98 4Q99 - 3Q09
Sample
Financial Expenses/EBIT (-1)
Market Value/Book Value (-1)
Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability (-1)










Note: We estimated the base model presented in table 7 preceding and following the economic policy “tripod” 
establishment in Brazil, based on primary fiscal surplus, inflation targets and free-floating exchange rate. This 
issue is important for credit channel, once the monetary policy suffered significant changes after this event. 








37Table 9 – Firm’s business cycle sensitiveness according to the credit market access measured through the 











(Financial Expenses/EBIT) 4,61E-02 -5,75E-05
x Dummy (-1) (0,024) (0,481)
-8,95E-05 -9,28E-05
(0,066) (0,055)
(Market Value/Book Value) -1,03E-01 -3,26E-02
x Dummy (-1) (0,502) (0,365)
-0,011 -0,012
(0,040) (0,018)
(Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability) -0,437 0,027
x Dummy (-1) (0,225) (0,027)
0,187 0,201
(0,083) (0,073)
(Short Term Debt/Total Assets) -0,276 -0,185
x Dummy (-1) (0,648) (0,082)
Hansen (0,277) (0,290)
Difference-in-Hansen (0,287) (0,406)
Autocorrelation test A. Bond
(1
a. order) / (2
a. order)
Total number of instruments 169 169
Sample n = 214      4Q99 - 3Q09     N = 3560
Inventories/Total Assets
Financial Expenses/EBIT (-1)
Market Value/Book Value (-1)
Net Op. Revenues/Total Assets
Inventories/Total Assets (-1)
Constant
Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability (-1)
Short Term Debt/Total Assets (-1)
(0,005) / (0,331) (0,006) / (0,331)
 
Note: We estimated the base model presented in table 7 including an interaction term obtained from the cross 
product between dummies variable created for the adopted credit market access criterions (insolvency and 
existence of long term debt rate) and respective indicators. We used the sample period after the tripod 
establishment in Brazil. Table 9 displays the results for both specifications. 
38Table 10 –Wald Test: including an interaction term obtained from the cross product between dummies 
variable created for the insolvency criterion and respective indicators 
Wald Test Tests
H0: A = B = 0 Conclusion
Financial Expenses /  2,41E-05 4,61E-02
EBIT (-1) (0,082) (0,024)
Market Value / -8,95E-05 -1,03E-01
Book Value (-1) (0,066) (0,502)
Fixed Assets/ -0,011 -0,437
Long-Term Liability (-1) (0,040) (0,225)
Short Term Debt/ 0,187 -0,276














Table 11 – Wald Test: including an interaction term obtained from the cross product between dummies 
variable created for the rating criterion and respective indicators 
Wald Test Tests
H0: A = B = 0 Conclusion
Financial Expenses /  2,49E-05 -5,75E-05
EBIT (-1) (0,120) (0,481)
Market Value / -9,28E-05 -3,26E-02
Book Value (-1) (0,055) (0,365)
Fixed Assets/ -0,012 0,027
Long-Term Liability (-1) (0,018) (0,027)
Short Term Debt/ 0,201 -0,185










Including dummy of rating fot the long term debt
 
 
Note: In order to appraise the significance of the interaction term and respective indicator, besides the individual 
significance test, we also applied the Wald test to assess the jointly significance of the variables. Tables 10 and 
11 summarize the tests results and coefficients of these variables for the adopted credit market access criterions 
(insolvency and existence of long term debt rate). We classified the coefficients according to significance and 
signal obtained. The coefficients that presented individual or joint significance with the expected signal were 
classified as “valid” (V). The coefficients that presented individual or joint significance with signal against our 
expectation were classified as “not valid” (NV). The coefficients that didn’t present individual or joint 










Table 12 – Firms in our sample that obtained BNDES’s finance lines for large-scale investment projects  
 













Oil and gas 6
Textile 3 31
29
Pulp and paper 5 4
Metallurgy and steelmaking 11











Note: In order to evaluate this hypothesis we used the same method applied in last subsection. We collected 
available information about BNDES’s direct operations and identified in our sample the firms that obtained 





















40Table 13 – Appraising the “BNDES effect” 
 











x Dummy (-1) (0,724)
-9,02E-05
(0,077)
(Market Value/Book Value) -2,59E-02
x Dummy (-1) (0,338)
-0,011
(0,034)
(Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability) 0,025
x Dummy (-1) (0,012)
0,212
0,083
(Short Term Debt/Total Assets) -0,178
x Dummy (-1) 0,142
Hansen (0,405)
Difference-in-Hansen (0,472)
Autocorrelation test A. Bond
(1
a. order) / (2
a. order)
Total number of instruments 169
Sample
n = 214      4Q99 - 3Q09        
   N = 3560
Financial Expenses/EBIT (-1)
Market Value/Book Value (-1)




Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability (-1)
Short Term Debt/Total Assets (-1)
 
 
Note: We estimated the base model presented in table 7 including an interaction term obtained from the cross 
product between the BNDES’s dummy variable and respective indicators. We used the sample period after the 
tripod establishment in Brazil. Table 13 displays the results for the specification. 
41Table 14 – Wald Test: including an interaction term obtained from the cross product between BNDES’s 
dummy variable and respective indicators  
Wald Test Tests
H0: A = B = 0 Conclusion
Financial Expenses /  1,27E-04 -1,09E-04
EBIT (-1) (0,683) (0,724)
Market Value / -9,02E-05 -2,59E-02
Book Value (-1) (0,077) (0,338)
Fixed Assets/ -0,011 0,025
Long-Term Liability (-1) (0,034) (0,012)
Short Term Debt/ 0,212 -0,178














Note: In order to appraise the significance of the interaction term and respective indicator, besides the individual 
significance test, we also applied the Wald test to assess the jointly significance of the variables. Table 14 
summarizes the tests results and coefficients of these variables for specification including an interaction term 
obtained from the cross product between BNDES’s dummy variable and respective indicators. We classified the 
coefficients according to significance and signal obtained. The coefficients that presented individual or joint 
significance with the expected signal were classified as “valid” (V). The coefficients that presented individual or 
joint significance with signal against our expectation were classified as “not valid” (NV). The coefficients that 

























42Note: In order to obtain the sector’s sensitiveness we calculated interaction terms crossing a dummy variable 
created for each sector in our sample with the indicators related to the credit market imperfections and estimated 
one specification for each sector. We kept the same indicators and instruments in all specifications to provide 
comparable results. Due to space restrictions, we opted to expose just the coefficients indicators related to credit 
market imperfections and interaction terms for each sector`s specification. After we evaluate the coefficient’s 
significance of the indicator and interaction term, we added the coefficients if they were individually or jointly 
significant (“valid” – V) and disregard if they didn’t present significant coefficients (“not conclusive” – NC). 
Tables 15 to 18 denote the estimated parameters for the financial indicators.  
Table 15 – Sector’s sensitiveness to credit market imperfections: Financial Expenses/EBIT 
Wald Test

















































































43Table 16 – Appraising the sector’s sensitiveness to credit market imperfections:  
Market Value/Book Value  
Wald Test















































Foods and beverages (0,060)
Electro-electronics (0,0181)




















44Table 17 – Appraising the sector’s sensitiveness to credit market imperfections:  
Fixed Assets/Long-Term Liability 
Wald Test
































Agriculture and fisheries (0,028)
Textile (0,028)
Transportation (0,068)
Vehicles and Spare Parts (0,009)
Oil and gas (0,104)
Chemical (0,065)
Metallurgy and steelmaking (0,012)
Mining (0,0173)
Non-metallic minerals (0,103)
Pulp and paper (0,060)
Sector
































45Table 18 – Appraising the sector’s sensitiveness to credit market imperfections:  
Short Term Debt/Total Assets 
Wald Test



































Vehicles and Spare Parts




Metallurgy and steelmaking (0,114) --
Pulp and paper (0,161) 5,82E-02
Oil and gas (0,114) --
Mining (0,141) --
Non-metallic minerals (0,132) --
Electro-electronics (0,013) -1,54E-01












46Note: The results presented in tables 15 to 18 were organized in tables 19 and 20. We present the sector’s 
business cycle sensitiveness according to each indicator. We reveal for each indicator the sector’s ranking 
classification according to the total marginal effect obtained adding the coefficients of the indicator itself and 
respective interaction term. 
 
Table 19 – Ranking of the sectors according to business cycle sensitiveness to credit market imperfections:  



























































































Vehicles and Spare Parts









47Table 20 – Ranking of the sectors according to business cycle sensitiveness to credit market imperfections:  
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